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ABSTRACT
There has been much debate among economists about whether nursing home quality is a public good
across Medicaid and private-pay patients within a common facility. However, there has been only
limited empirical work addressing this issue. Using a unique individual level panel of residents of
nursing homes from seven states, we exploit both within-facility and within-patient variation in payer
source and quality to examine this issue. We also test the robustness of these results across states
with  different  Medicaid  and  private-pay  rate  differentials.  Across  our  various  identification
strategies, the results generally support the idea that quality is a public good within nursing homes.
That is, within a common nursing home, there is very little evidence to suggest that Medicaid-funded
residents receive consistently lower quality care relative to their private-paying counterparts.
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A principal goal of the Medicare-Medicaid legislation passed by Congress in 1965 was 
the incorporation of the elderly and poor into “mainstream” medical care. Despite this objective, 
there have been a series of studies and reports documenting poor quality for Medicaid residents 
within nursing homes over the last three decades (e.g., U.S. Senate, 1974; Institute of Medicine, 
2001).  In assessing the impact of payer source on nursing home treatment quality, researchers 
have basically assumed that poor quality for Medicaid recipients is a cross-facility phenomenon. 
The research community has ignored the idea that there may be within-facility variation by 
assuming that nursing home quality is a public good enjoyed by all residents within a facility, 
regardless of payer type. 
There are legal, behavioral and economic arguments underlying this assumption. From a 
legal perspective, nursing homes certified to accept Medicaid or Medicare residents are required 
by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide equal quality to all 
residents, regardless of payer type. However, monitoring and enforcing this uniform quality 
constraint is quite difficult. Towards that end, the U.S. General Accounting Office (1990) has 
received reports of the segregation of Medicaid and private-pay residents within a nursing home. 
From a behavioral perspective, there is a long-standing notion that professional norms matter in 
health care (Arrow, 1963). Behavioral constructs such as trust, fairness and regret may explain 
why providers put a value on treating all patients according to the same criteria (Frank, 2004). 
Finally, from an economic perspective, certain nursing home services such as dietary services are 
produced jointly for both payer types and may exhibit economies of joint production (Gertler and 
Waldman, 1992). However, the majority of direct care nursing home services would not exhibit   3 
economies of joint production. Moreover, there is substantial evidence from the physician and 
hospital settings that patients with different payer sources are treated differently (Gruber, 2000).  
If quality is a public good across payer types, then there is the potential for state 
Medicaid programs to “free ride” on higher paying private residents. In order for this to occur, 
state Medicaid programs must ensure the joint care of Medicaid and private-pay residents in a 
common facility. Historically, most states have used certificate of need (CON) and construction 
moratorium laws to constrain the growth of nursing home beds. The stated rationale of these 
programs was to conserve Medicaid spending by limiting Medicaid bed slots, but a secondary 
goal was to limit the ability of private-paying residents to segregate themselves in facilities 
without Medicaid patients. 
Given the joint care of private-pay and Medicaid patients in many facilities, early 
economic analyses of the nursing home industry routinely assumed uniform quality across payer 
types. Building from this assumption, an influential literature has argued that—in the context of a 
binding CON law—an increase in Medicaid payment rates should increase the share of Medicaid 
patients and thereby lower quality for all patients (Nyman, 1988b; Gertler, 1989). More recent 
work has argued that this finding does not generalize to today’s nursing home market 
(Grabowski 2001). One unresolved issue that may explain the different results across these 
studies is the validity of the uniform quality assumption.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, there 
has been virtually no empirical work examining whether nursing home quality is a public good. 
This lack of previous work on this topic likely reflects the nursing home data previously 
available to researchers. Broadly, two alternative types of nursing home data were available: 
facility-level administrative databases and nationally representative surveys of nursing home 
residents. With the former, because the data are collected at the facility-level, there is no means   4 
by which to parse out within-facility quality differences by payer type. With the latter, the data 
are collected at the resident-level, but there are rarely a sufficient number of residents sampled 
from any one facility to make meaningful within-facility comparisons. Thus, neither of these 
data sources can address the research question of whether nursing home quality is a public good. 
We provide the first careful exploration of this question using a valuable new source of 
nursing home data. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 87) mandated that 
each state collect a quarterly assessment for all residents in certified nursing homes. In the fourth 
quarter of 1998, CMS established a national repository of these data. We have identified seven 
states from this national repository with accurate quarterly payer source information over time. 
We have access to twelve process and outcome based indicators of nursing home quality over 
time, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of quality of care.  
With this unique individual level panel of nursing home data, we consider several 
alternative models of the relationship between payer source and quality.  We begin with a cross-
sectional model relating quality to payer source.  Such a model suffers from two-sided selection, 
however: homes with more Medicaid patients may be of different quality for unobserved 
reasons; and patients who are on Medicaid may be differentially sick for unobserved reasons.  
We attempt to address both of these concerns by including fixed effects for both nursing homes, 
and then also for individuals. This latter model is therefore identified by the “spend down” from 
private-pay to Medicaid status for individual residents, and compares the change in quality over 
time for private-pay residents who qualify for Medicaid relative to the change in quality over 
time for residents who remain private payers.   
Ultimately, across all three models, we find strong support for the public good 
assumption: quality of care is no lower for Medicaid patients within nursing homes.  We assess   5 
the sensitivity of our findings to a variety of specification tests, including the use of differences 
in Medicaid rate differentials across states to control for selection, and find them quite robust.  
Thus, nursing home care does in fact appear to be a public good. 
 
I. Background 
Nursing Home Sector  
Nursing home residents requiring custodial care generally either pay for care privately or 
by qualifying for a Medicaid-financed stay. Medicaid is the dominant purchaser of nursing home 
services accounting for roughly 50% of all nursing home expenditures and 70% of all bed days. 
In practice, nursing homes have a great deal of discretion as to which patients they choose to 
accept for admission. The only constraint is that a facility must be certified in order to accept 
Medicaid and Medicare residents (and certification is almost universal among homes with 
approximately 96% certified) (Strahan, 1997). In contrast, homes are quite restricted in their 
ability to discharge residents (regardless of payer type) once they have been admitted.
1  
Private-paying residents are charged the price chosen by the home subject to market 
competition while Medicaid residents are paid for by various methods via state-run programs. 
States have considerable flexibility to design their Medicaid nursing home payment systems and 
set payment rates. Medicaid programs generally pay below the private price. Not surprisingly, 
the majority of empirical evidence supports the assertion that Medicaid residents have more 
restricted access to nursing homes (e.g., Ettner 1993). Medicaid eligibility is determined on a 
                                                 
1 The facility may not transfer or discharge the resident unless: 1) The transfer or discharge is necessary to meet the 
resident’s welfare and the resident’s welfare cannot be met in the facility; 2) The transfer or discharge is appropriate 
because the resident’s health has improved sufficiently so the resident no longer needs the services provided by the 
facility; 3) The safety of individuals in the facility is endangered; 4) The health of individuals in the facility would 
otherwise be endangered; 5) The resident has failed, after reasonable and appropriate notice, to pay for a stay at the 
facility (note that conversion from the private-pay price to payment at the Medicaid rate does not constitute non-
payment); or 6) The facility ceases to operate (Health Care Financing Administration 1995). 
   6 
state-by-state basis by the resident’s level of income and assets. Some residents qualify for 
Medicaid at the time of entry to the nursing home while others “spend-down” in order to qualify 
for coverage. That is, these individuals do not meet the state Medicaid asset threshold at the time 
of nursing home entry, but in the course of paying for their nursing home care, their assets 
decline to the state threshold and they qualify for Medicaid-financed care. Studies have estimated 
that only between 10 and 25% of all private-paying residents eventually spend-down to Medicaid 
eligibility (Adams, Burwell and Meiners, 1993).  
Even though the Medicaid rate is below the private price in most cases, homes that are 
certified to accept Medicaid residents are required by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to provide a uniform level of quality to all residents, regardless of payer type. 
The nursing home State Operations Manual published by CMS (formerly the Health Care 
Financing Administration) states that “facilities must not distinguish between residents based on 
their source of payment when providing services that are required to be provided under the law. 
All nursing services, specialized rehabilitative services, social services, dietary services, 
pharmaceutical services, or activities that are mandated by the law must be provided to residents 
according to residents’ individual needs, as determined by assessments and care plans” 
(Guideline 483.12(c), Health Care Financing Administration, 1995). If homes indeed provide 
quality common to all residents, then Medicaid residents have the potential to “free ride” on 
higher paying private residents. If homes can disregard this regulation, then homes can provide 
different quality levels to residents from different payer types. 
Existing Evidence on Variation in Nursing Home Quality by Payer Type 
Chandra and Skinner (2003) suggest that disparities in health care should be decomposed 
into their proximate causes with respect to “across facility” variation (i.e., certain patients are   7 
admitted to facilities with poorer care practices) and “within facility” variation (i.e., certain 
patients are treated differently within a health care facility). Although Chandra and Skinner posit 
that cross-facility variation likely dwarfs within-facility variation in many health applications, 
there is evidence that within-facility variation matters in the hospital context (Gruber, 2000).  For 
example, Hadley and colleagues (1991) compared the treatment of insured and uninsured 
patients in the hospital, and they found that fewer resources were used in the care of the 
uninsured. Specifically, the uninsured were 29% to 75% less likely to undergo each of five high-
cost or high-discretion procedures. Currie and Gruber (2001) found that expansions in the 
Medicaid program differentially affected the hospital treatment of privately insured and 
Medicaid insured patients.  Finally, Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin (1999) found that higher Medicaid 
fee differentials for cesarean section delivery were associated with higher rates of cesarean 
delivery among Medicaid patients. They estimated that as much as one-half of the sizable 
difference in cesarean rates across Medicaid and private-pay patients was due to differential 
payment rates.  
Both within-facility and cross-facility variation can lead to poorer outcomes for certain 
payer groups, but the difference lies in the policy implications. In the case of across-facility 
disparities in care, policymakers may wish to consider initiatives that improve the patient’s 
choice set, address broader geographic disparities in resources, guard against discriminatory 
admission practices, and prevent the segregation of payer types across homes. For example, 
states can adopt wait list laws that require nursing homes to admit applicants on a first-come, 
first-served basis or census requirements that involve admissions on a first-come, first-served 
basis until a specified census of Medicaid residents is achieved (U.S. General Accounting Office, 
1990). Within-facility variation involves the internal workings of specific health care facilities,   8 
and financial barriers, preferences of patients, and provider behaviors may underlie disparities 
across payer groups. Policymakers may wish to consider stricter enforcement of the uniform 
quality standard, or rate equalization laws such as those found in Minnesota and North Dakota 
that prohibit homes from charging rates for private-payers above the Medicaid payment level. 
There is a substantial literature examining across-facility variation in nursing home 
quality by payer mix. A number of studies have shown that a higher proportion of Medicaid 
residents within a nursing home is negatively related to expenditures by the facility (e.g., 
Birnbaum et al., 1981; Nyman, 1988a; Schlenker and Shaughnessy, 1984). Gottesman (1974) 
found that frequency of care by staff members diminished with higher numbers of public-pay 
residents. In contrast, Nyman (1988c) found no significant relationship between the proportion of 
Medicaid residents and the ratings of patient care or dietary plans. The use of outcome measures 
in this literature is scant. Nyman (1988c) revealed no Medicaid-quality relationship with respect 
to resident care or quality-of-life measures. In related work however, Nyman (1988b) did find 
that regulatory violations occur with greater frequency in high Medicaid homes. Part of the 
explanation for the mixed results may be the failure of these studies to address the potential 
endogeneity of facility-level payer mix and quality. 
There is scant research examining within-facility variation in nursing home quality. A 
consumer advocacy group in New York reported to the U.S. General Accounting Office (1990) 
that, “many nursing homes were…segregating Medicaid and private-pay residents within the 
nursing home” (page 18). However, there is very little work that has empirically tested this issue. 
Using 1983 Texas Medicaid cost report data, McKay (1989) found that the mix of Medicaid and 
private-pay residents did not affect a facility’s marginal, average or total costs, which provides 
some very limited evidence that private-pay and Medicaid residents receive a uniform level of   9 
care.  However, expenditures are a very indirect (and highly criticized) measure of quality. 
Greater expenditures can mean higher quality or they can mean increased inefficiency on the part 
of the facility.  
Since beginning our work on this topic, a paper was published addressing cross-facility 
and within-facility variation in nursing home mortality. Troyer (2004) found large cross-facility 
differences in mortality for Medicaid and private-paying residents in Florida for the period 1986 
through 1997. However, when facility fixed-effects were included, these mortality differences 
largely fell away, suggesting that there is not within-facility variation across Medicaid and 
private paying residents. Among the papers in the literature, the Troyer study most closely 
approximates our own approach. However, there are some significant limitations of this paper 
that merit mention. Because mortality is an extreme outcome that may not be responsive to 
quality differences, it has not been included as a potential quality indicator in the recent 
validation efforts by CMS (Morris et al., 2003). In fact, CMS excluded those residents “near 
death” from the denominator in calculating other quality indicators. Part of the problem with 
using mortality as an indicator of quality is measurement error in that private-pay patients may 
disproportionately return home prior to death while Medicaid patients may be disproportionately 
hospitalized prior to death (Freiman and Murtaugh, 1993; Weissert and Scanlon, 1985). In this 
paper, we employ a range of validated quality indicators to test the public good hypothesis. It is 
also important to note that the Troyer paper does not employ individual fixed effects, and 
because it is a single-state study, it cannot exploit variation in Medicaid policy across states. Our 
study is able to employ both nursing home and individual fixed effects and exploit cross-state 
variation in the Medicaid rate-private pay fee differentials. 
   10 
Model of the Nursing Home Industry 
From the Handbook of Health Economics chapter on long-term care (Norton, 2000), the 
canonical model of the nursing home assumes that private-pay and Medicaid residents receive a 
uniform level of quality (q). In this model, state-level certificate-of-need (CON) and construction 
moratorium laws act as a barrier to entry by constraining the number of allowable beds in the 
marketplace (Scanlon, 1980). Because state Medicaid programs pay below the private-pay price, 
a facility will first accept higher-paying private-pay residents and then fill the remaining beds 
with Medicaid residents. Thus, private-pay demand is still satisfied under a binding bed 
constraint, but some potential Medicaid residents may not gain nursing home placement creating 
an excess Medicaid demand equilibrium.  
Under this excess demand model, private-pay demand (x) is assumed to be a function of 
private price (p) and quality, but Medicaid demand is not assumed to be a function of quality. 
After private-pay demand is met, it is assumed that the home can always fill any remaining beds 
with Medicaid recipients, regardless of the quality provided. In essence, a home need not 
consider the preferences of Medicaid residents in solving its profit-maximization problem. Thus, 
Medicaid usage can be modeled as the number of beds remaining after private-pay demand has 
been satisfied, or, [ ( , ) x x p q - ] where  x  is some target level of filled beds for the home (here 
assumed to be capacity). Additionally, because it is assumed that this bed constraint is binding, 
the home will always reach this target occupancy, and the cost function can be evaluated at  x . 
Thus, the nursing home takes the Medicaid payment rate (r) and its own bed supply ( x ) as 
givens, and chooses the private price and a uniform level of quality to maximize profits: 
 
, max ( , ) ( ( , )) ( | ).
p q px p q r x x p q c q x p = + - -   (1)   11 
In this model, it is assumed that 0 p x < ,  0 q x > , and 0 q c > . The first-order conditions with 
respect to price and uniform quality are: 
  ( ) 0, p p p r x x p = - + =   (2) 
  ( ) 0. q q q p r x c p = - - =   (3) 
The first-order conditions provide the standard implication that the nursing home sets the 
marginal revenue from a change in either private price or quality of care to be equal to the 
marginal cost.  
A number of papers have used this general framework to derive testable implications 
regarding the effect of the Medicaid reimbursement on nursing home quality (e.g., Gertler, 1989; 
Nyman, 1985). Nursing homes are assumed to compete for private patients on the basis of 
quality and price, but because of the excess demand assumption, homes do not need to compete 
for Medicaid patients on the basis of quality. As state Medicaid programs raise their 
reimbursement levels, homes on the margin will want more Medicaid patients, which entails 
fewer private-pay patients due to the binding bed constraint. Because quality is a public good, an 
increase in Medicaid payment lowers overall facility-level quality. The early research in this area 
found empirical support for this hypothesis using cross-sectional data in a single state from the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The quality measures used in this literature included staffing and 
nursing home violations. However, recent empirical work has argued that the earlier finding does 
not generalize to national data, more recent data, longitudinal data or outcome quality measures 
(Grabowski, 2001; 2004).  
Moreover, because the early work in this area used facility-level staffing and violations, it 
was impossible to test the uniform quality assumption. Indeed, one explanation for the different   12 
findings in the Medicaid payment-quality literature is the public good assumption, the key 
assumption of the early literature. 
Given the potential quality improvement for Medicaid recipients when integrated in a 
common nursing home with private-paying residents, Norton (2000) argued that the payer mix 
itself may be a policy instrument towards addressing low nursing home quality. For 
mathematical ease, Norton assumes that the policy variable is the number of Medicaid residents 
(not the proportion). If we suppose that a binding rule on the number of Medicaid residents (m) 
is relaxed slightly but there is still excess demand, then the number of private-pay residents is the 
total number of beds less the number of Medicaid residents. The nursing home will offset the 
increase in Medicaid residents one-for-one with a decrease in private-pay residents. If the 
constraint is binding, Norton shows that it is not necessary to solve a system of equations to find 








= - <   (5) 
Thus, if a binding constraint on the number (or proportion) of Medicaid residents is relaxed, the 
private-pay price increases and the quality of care decreases. By limiting the proportion of 
Medicaid residents a facility can admit (and thus effectively exposing Medicaid residents to 
more private-pay residents), we would theoretically see an improvement in the provision of 
quality for Medicaid residents. However, this result assumes that quality is uniform across 
Medicaid and private-pay residents. If we were to relax the uniform quality assumption across 
payer types, then the gains of placing Medicaid recipients in a home with private-paying   13 
residents would be attenuated.   Thus, for policy analysis, it is central to evaluate the validity of 
the common quality assumption that drives these types of conclusions.   
 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data 
Our data are a census of all nursing home residents from seven states obtained from the 
Minimum Data Set (MDS) for nursing homes. Based on a federal requirement, the MDS 
instrument collects over 350 discrete data elements including socio-demographic information, 
numerous clinical items ranging from degree of functional dependence to cognitive functioning, 
and a checklist for staff to indicate the presence of the most common geriatric diagnoses (MDS 
Training Manual, 1995; Morris et al., 1994). Typically, the MDS form is filled out a by a 
registered nurse (RN) working at the facility. Assessments are performed on admission, upon 
significant change, and at least quarterly, so that there is a panel of assessments for the same 
individual over time. When there were multiple assessments within a quarter, we used the 
assessment closest to the mid-point of the quarter. 
We have access to the MDS beginning in 4
th quarter of 1998 through the 4
th quarter of 
2002 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). As such, our data are a combination of existing 
residents (those admitted prior to 4
th quarter 1998) and new admissions (those admitted 4
th 
quarter of 1998 or later). We alternatively estimate models below containing the full sample 
(N=1,626,628) and only those new admissions (N=872,667).  
      INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The analysis was restricted to seven states because accurate payer source information was 
not available for the other states. Payer source on admission was nearly always recorded on the   14 
MDS form, but in many instances, the payer source field was not updated in subsequent MDS 
assessments. Thus, we were not able to obtain accurate payer source information over time for 
the majority of states. Based on a series of checks, the seven states with accurate payer source 
information used within this study were Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota and Washington.
2  
Payer status is coded on each quarterly MDS assessment based on ten categories 
measuring nursing home payment via (i) a Medicaid per diem, (ii) Medicare per diem, (iii) 
Medicare ancillary part A, (iv) Medicare ancillary part B, (v) CHAMPUS per diem, (vi) VA per 
diem, (vii) self or family pays full per diem, (viii) Medicaid resident liability or Medicare co-
payment, (ix) private insurance per diem (including co-payment), and (x) other per diem. 
Importantly, these categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, in order to qualify for the 
Medicaid per diem payment (category i), some individuals face a co-payment (category viii) for 
any income they have above the state Medicaid income threshold. In an effort to create three 
payment categories, we used a series of decision rules in placing residents into the Medicaid, 
private-pay, and other payer groups. First, because we are interested in the primary payer within 
this study, we did not use ancillary Medicare payments (categories iii and iv) in the assignment 
to payer groups. Second, because we are interested in chronic (and not rehabilitative) nursing 
home care, we excluded those Medicare assessments from the analysis. That is, any assessment 
coded in category (ii) was dropped from our dataset. Third, any individual in category (vii) or 
category (ix) was considered private-pay. Fourth, we categorized all individuals from group (i) 
as Medicaid, regardless of whether they faced some co-payment (viii). Finally, we created an 
                                                 
2 We used three separate checks to ensure the quality of the payer source field within the MDS. First, we examined 
whether patients that entered under Medicare converted to another payer type at the 100-day Medicare limit. 
Second, we compared the aggregate facility-level payer mix from the MDS with the aggregate payer mix from the 
Federal government’s Online, Survey Certification and Reporting System.  Finally, we compared spend-down rates 
from private-pay to Medicaid status in the MDS with published estimates from other data sources.   15 
other payer group for individuals in CHAMPUS (category v), VA (category vi) and other 
(category x). 
There is no single preferred measure of nursing home quality in the MDS data, so we 
have formed 12 indicators of quality based on the available information (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2002).  By examining patterns for all 12 indicators, we hope to assess most 
generally whether quality is a common good. 
Our quality measures consist of five “process” based measures and seven “outcome” 
based measures of quality.  The process based measures are: 
·  The presence of a physical restraint: immobility resulting from the use of physical 
restraints may increase the risk of pressure ulcers, depression, mental and physical 
deterioration, and mortality (Zinn, 1993).  
·  Use of an indwelling catheter: urethral catheterization places the resident at greater risk 
for urinary tract infection; other long-term complications include bladder and renal 
stones, abcesses, and renal failure. 
·  Bedfast: although many residents are bedfast due to medical conditions, bedfast residents 
are at a higher risk of developing pressure ulcers and other complications.  
·  Use of a feeding tube: feeding tubes can result in complications including self-extubation, 
infections, aspiration, unintended misplacement of the tube, and pain.   
·  The use of anti-psychotics; overuse of anti-psychotics may result in mental and physical 
deterioration (Harrington et al, 1992).  
The outcome based measures are: 
·  Pressure ulcers: pressure ulcers are areas of the skin and underlying tissues that erode as 
a result of pressure or friction and/or lack of blood supply.   16 
·  The presence of daily pain: pain is a common condition related to numerous age 
associated diseases such as cancer, arthritis, and diabetic neuropathy. However, pain can 
be moderated, and the management of pain in the nursing home setting is often 
substandard (Ferrell, 1995).  
·  Bowel or bladder incontinence: although some decline in bladder or bowel continence 
may not be reversible or manageable in the latter stages of disease (e.g., dementia, 
terminal illness), it is thought to be preventable and reversible in the nursing home 
population (Schnelle and Leung, 2004). 
·  Urinary tract infections and wound infections: infections occur frequently among nursing 
home residents with the potential for significant morbidity and mortality (Nicolle, 2000).  
·  Presence of a fall over the 30 days prior to the assessment: falls are a major source of 
morbidity and mortality among nursing home residents.  Although falls have been shown 
to be preventable in the nursing home environment, approximately half of all patients fall 
each year, and 9% sustain serious injury (Ray et al., 1997).  
·  Depression: major depression is associated with increased functional
 dependence, health 
care utilization, and mortality (Simmons et al., 2004). 
A number of patient-level covariates were available from the MDS. In order to capture 
the need for services, an activities of daily living (ADL) score was created for each resident 
assessment. The ADL score is based on the individual’s need for help with bathing, bed mobility, 
dressing, eating, toileting, and transferring. For each of these six areas, the individual is scored as 
a zero (independent), one (supervised), two (limited assistance), three (extensive assistance) or 
four (total dependence). Thus, the total ADL score ranges between zero and twenty-four. For the 
analyses, we included 24 dummy variables in our regressions. In order to capture cognitive   17 
performance, we also included seven dummy variables, ranging from zero to six in value, from 
the Cognitive Performance Scale (CPS) developed by Morris and colleagues (1994).  
We also include a set of dummy variables measuring length-of-stay. With these dummy 
variables in our regressions, it is important to note that we are not simply identifying length of 
stay effects, but true transition effects. Specifically, we created a dummy variable to approximate 
length of stay for each quarter up through 10 years in the nursing home. The final dummy 
variable measures length of stay greater than 10 years. Thus, we have 40 dummy variables to 
model length of stay.  Finally, we also included a number of demographic variables including 
age, gender, race, education, and marital status.  
The MDS assessments from these seven states were merged with two other facility-level 
data sources. First, the MDS is a resident-level instrument that does not contain facility-level 
information. Thus, ownership status and other institutional information on nursing homes are 
obtained from the On-Line Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system. The OSCAR 
system contains information from state surveys of all federally certified Medicaid (nursing 
facilities) and Medicare (skilled nursing care) homes in the United States.  Certified homes 
represent almost 96% of all facilities nationwide (Strahan, 1997). Collected and maintained by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems (CMS), the OSCAR data are used to determine 
whether homes are in compliance with federal regulatory requirements. Every facility is required 
to have an initial survey to verify compliance.  Thereafter, states are required to survey each 
facility no less often than every 15 months, and the average is about 12 months (Harrington et 
al., 1999). From the OSCAR, we included measures of bed size, ownership status, and chain 
ownership.    18 
  Second, we obtained nursing home cost report information from each state’s Medicaid 
office. These annual cost reports provided data on the private-pay and Medicaid payment rates 
for each facility. Table 2 provides the average payment rates for each state and year contained in 
our study. Without adjusting for resident acuity, the Medicaid payment rate ranges from 76% to 
108% of the private-pay price. North Dakota is the only state with a higher (unadjusted) 
Medicaid rate relative to the private-pay rate across all years.
3 As discussed above, North Dakota 
has a rate equalization law under which all residents – regardless of payer type – are grouped 
into one of thirty-five payment levels based on their acuity. Thus, the higher aggregate Medicaid 
payment rate reflects the fact that Medicaid patients are less healthy relative to their private-pay 
counterparts. 
        INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Empirical Strategy 
  We pursue a variety of empirical specifications designed to determine whether Medicaid 
patients are treated in a systematically different fashion than non-Medicaid patients.  We begin 
by estimating cross-sectional models of the form: 
Yint = ￿ + ￿1OTHERint + ￿2MEDICAIDint + ￿Xint + ￿Znt + ￿t + ￿int    (6) 
where i indexes individuals, n indexes nursing homes, and t indexes time periods, Y is the 
outcome variable, OTHER and MEDICAID are dummies for other payer and Medicaid (relative 
to private-pay), X is a set of individual characteristics, Z is a set of nursing home characteristics, 
￿t are time (quarter) fixed effects, and ￿int is the randomly distributed error term. The quarter 
dummies control for national trends in nursing home quality that may be correlated with shifts in 
the mix of Medicaid and private-pay residents. 
                                                 
3 The results presented in this paper are robust to excluding the North Dakota assessments from the analyses.   19 
  As noted in the introduction, models such as (6) will be biased due to both unobserved 
facility and individual characteristics.  Our second specification deals with the first of these 
problems by including nursing home fixed effects (￿n): 
Yint = ￿ + ￿1OTHERint + ￿2MEDICAIDint + ￿Xint + ￿Znt + ￿t + ￿n + ￿int    (7) 
The nursing home fixed effects control for any fixed facility-specific omitted variables correlated 
with the quality of care such as the facility’s management philosophy or facility culture.  Thus,  
Equation (7) deals with the first type of selection identified above, that homes with a higher 
share of Medicaid may be ones that treat their patients worse for other reasons.  
  Although this fixed-effects specification eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity at the 
level of the facility, it may still suffer from bias due to unobserved heterogeneity at the level of 
the patient. For example, even though we control for detailed case-mix information in the model 
above, there may still exist unobserved health characteristics that influence both nursing home 
choice and outcomes. Thus, we next estimate models of the following form: 
Yint = ￿ + ￿1OTHERint + ￿2MEDICAIDint + ￿Xint + ￿Znt + ￿t + ￿i + ￿int    (8) 
where the model specification is identical to equation 1 above except the facility fixed effects are 
replaced with patient fixed effects ￿i. In this model, the basic identification strategy purges the 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity by relying on spend-down from private-pay to Medicaid 
status over time.
4  That is, this model controls for fixed but unobservable characteristics of both 
nursing homes and patients, allowing us to ask: does treatment quality change when patients 
change payer source? 
  There are two potential problems with this empirical framework, however.  The first is 
the potential endogeneity of payer status and quality. There may exist unobserved, time-varying 
                                                 
4 Person fixed effects will subsume home fixed effects for patients who do not move between homes. However, the 
overall transfer rate per year at risk has been estimated at 3.3% (Hirth et al, 2003), so this is not a large issue.  If we 
include home fixed effects as well as the patient fixed effects in these models, the results are unchanged.   20 
factors that are correlated with both payer status and quality, for example if somehow negative 
health shocks lead individuals to switch to Medicaid.   We address this concern in two ways 
below.  First, we explicitly model observable patient health as a function of payer status, to see if 
there is a correlation with a measurable source of selection.  We find that, once patient fixed 
effects are included, such correlation is quite small.  Second, we provide estimates that exploit 
cross-state variation in the difference between Medicaid payment rates and private-pay prices 
(see Table 2).  In both the facility (eq. 7) and individual (eq. 8) fixed effects models, we 
incorporate both a fee ratio, which is the average state Medicaid payment rate divided by the 
average state private-pay price, and an interaction term between this fee ratio and Medicaid 
status. If Medicaid residents receive lower quality than their private-pay counterparts, this effect 
should be largest in states with the greatest difference between the private-pay price and the 
Medicaid payment rate; where this fee differential is zero, there should be no quality difference.  
This model is free of selection as long as any bias from time-varying unobserved variables is 
equally important in high and low differential homes/states. 
  The other problem with equation (8) is that it captures a specific type of payer source 
change, the spend-down from private pay to Medicaid.  It is possible that patients who are 
admitted from the start as Medicaid are treated worse than those who are private pay, but that 
when private pay patients transition to Medicaid their treatment does not change (for example 
because the nursing home has already established a treatment regime).  That is, by identifying 
our models from transitions, we may miss important elements of nursing home discrimination 
that apply only to those admitted under different payer statuses, not those who transition across 
payer status. 
  There is no way to both address this problem and control for unobserved patient   21 
characteristics.  However, we can determine the magnitude this problem by focusing solely on 
new nursing home admissions (i.e., individuals admitted in the 4
th quarter of 1998 or later), and 
estimating the model as a function of payer status at admission.  We present results from this 
approach below. 
  Given the size of our dataset, least squares models estimations of linear probability 
regression models are presented. Although this approach does not recognize the binary nature of 
the quality measures, it facilitates the tractable estimation of these models, which are based on a 
large number of observations and an expansive set of regression controls. In the results tables 
presented below, only the Medicaid coefficients and the absolute value of the t-statistics are 
included.  Because we have multiple observations on each individual, standard errors are 
clustered at the level of the individual. 
 
III. Basic Results 
   The first set of regression results includes both the existing residents when our MDS 
panel started and residents admitted in that and subsequent quarters (see Table 3). Importantly, 
all twelve outcomes are negative indicators of quality; thus, a positive Medicaid coefficient 
translates into lower quality for this payer group. Moreover, given our huge sample size, it 
should be noted that we have a great deal of precision in our estimates. Thus, nearly every 
coefficient estimate presented in Table 3 is statistically significant at the conventional level, even 
when our standard errors are corrected for individual-level correlation across quarters. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The first column of results excludes fixed-effects and is identified solely by cross-
sectional variation in payer source and quality.  The first five rows present the process-based   22 
quality measures; the next seven rows show the outcome-based quality measures. 
The results from this cross-sectional model are surprisingly mixed: contrary to 
expectations, we do not find clear evidence of lower quality for Medicaid patients, even without 
controlling for home or person fixed effects.  For the process measures, three are positive, 
indicating worse quality for Medicaid patients (restraints, anti-psychotics, and feeding tubes), 
although only one (anti-psychotics) is significant; two are negative, indicating better quality for 
Medicaid patients (catheters, bedfast), and both are significant.  For the outcome measures, three 
are positive, indicating worse quality for Medicaid patients (pain, incontinence, and depression), 
while four are negative, indicating better quality for Medicaid patients (pressure ulcers, urinary 
infection, wound infection, and falls); all are significant.  These mixed findings are surprising 
given the general presumption that Medicaid patients are treated worse in nursing homes. 
The effects, however, are uniformly very small.  The only effects that amount to more 
than 10% of the baseline means in Table 1 are catheters (-11%), wound infections (-20%), and 
falls (-14%).  Given this pattern, the weight of the evidence actually appears to point towards 
better quality for Medicaid patients.  But the overall pattern is one of small and inconsistent 
effects. 
The second column presents results from a model that includes nursing home fixed 
effects. This model is identified by within-facility variation in payer status and nursing home 
quality, so that we are comparing the treatment of Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients within 
the same facility.  The results are remarkably similar to those without home fixed effects.  
Indeed, if anything, there is even more evidence of a positive treatment of Medicaid patients in 
this model, as the two process measures which were insignificant and positive (restraints and 
feeding tubes) are now negative and (at least marginally) significant.  But the results remain   23 
small overall, and once again mixed, with positive coefficients (negative quality) on important 
measures such as pain, incontinence, and depression. 
The third column presents results from a model including patient-level fixed effects, 
which is identified by within-patient variation (i.e., spend-down to Medicaid).  These results 
have shifted slightly from the results including home fixed effects, but they present a similar 
story: mixed evidence that, if anything, suggests higher quality for Medicaid patients.  Once 
again, the results remain small in magnitude. The estimates that amounted to more than 10% of 
their baseline values were catheters (-15%), feeding tubes (-10%), pressure ulcers (-12%), 
urinary infections (-14%), wound infections (-20%) and falls (-12%). Put alternatively, the 
estimated coefficients in column 3 were each less than 6% of a standard deviation of the 
dependent variable means. 
  In sum, the fixed effects specifications provide inconsistent results as to whether nursing 
home quality is a public good. Some measures indicated worse quality for Medicaid recipients 
while others indicated better quality. In general, the magnitude of the coefficients was quite 
small. 
 
IV.  Addressing Selection and Locality of Treatment Effects. 
The inclusion of both nursing home and patient-level fixed effects in our models should, 
in principle, address selection problems.  However, it remains possible that patients are 
becoming unobservably sicker, or even healthier, around the time of transition to Medicaid.  This 
could bias our results in the direction of finding negative, or positive, effects of Medicaid on 
quality.  In addition, as discussed earlier, our models with patient fixed effects are identified only 
from transitions, and it is possible that there is differential treatment of Medicaid patients upon   24 
arrival that is not present when they transition.  This is the problem of “local average treatment 
effects”, whereby our estimates reflect the true answer for a particular population but not for 
others. 
We address these two issues in this section of the paper.  First, we assess whether 
selection appears to be a problem by examining observable indicators of health to see if they are 
correlated with transitions to Medicaid payer status.  We then turn to using rate differentials 
across states to add extra identification to the model.  Finally, we consider models that focus just 
on payer status at admission to assess whether there is differential treatment based on initial 
payer. 
 
Selection on Observables 
  The inclusion of fixed effects in our models is designed to capture home and individual-
based selection that might bias our quality estimates.  Whether these strategies are successful is 
unknowable, but we can get some perspective on this issue by looking at observable correlates of 
selection.  As argued formally by Altonji and Taber (2000), if observables are sufficiently 
predictable of unobservables, then assessing the correlation of the variable of interest with 
observables can provide some indicator of the potential bias from omitting unobservables.  In our 
context, the unobservable of most interest is health, and we have an excellent observable 
indicator of health: measures of activities of daily living. 
  We therefore reestimate each of our models where the dependent variable, quality, is 
replaced with the ADL index described earlier, which takes on values of 0-24.  Obviously, in 
these models we exclude the 24 ADL index dummies from the regression.  We then assess   25 
whether our Medicaid indicator is correlated with the ADL index in each of our specifications, 
and whether the correlation is substantively large enough to likely bias our estimates. 
  The results of this exercise are shown in Table 4.  For models without home/person fixed 
effects, there is a very large and significant negative correlation between Medicaid status and 
observed health: Medicaid patients are in worse health.  The results show that being on Medicaid 
is associated with a reduction in ADL score of 0.384, relative to a mean score of 14.4.  This 
suggests that, if anything, our results without home/person fixed effects are biased in favor of 
finding low quality for Medicaid patients, making the mixed results in that model even more 
striking. 
  When we include home fixed effects in the second column, the coefficient does not 
change much: there remains a strong negative correlation with the ADL score (actually even 
stronger than in the first column).  The results change significantly in the third column. However, 
when person fixed effects are included: there is now a small positive correlation with Medicaid.  
That is, this model indicates that individuals are, along observable dimensions, becoming 
healthier when they transition to Medicaid.  This is indicative of selection which biases in our 
favor, even in the patient fixed effects models.  The effect is very small, however, and amounts 
to only 0.5% of the sample mean; it is only significant because of the enormous size of our 
sample. 
  We can confirm this point by assessing how large any selection effects are relative to our 
earlier estimates.  We do this by (a) running regressions of each quality measure on the ADL 
score, (b) multiplying the coefficients from this regression times the 0.065 coefficient from this 
home/person fixed effects regression, and (c) dividing the resulting product by the Medicaid 
coefficient reported in Table 3.  That is, this exercise asks: given how much health matters for   26 
quality, and given the selection effects we see for health, how large a bias does that cause for the 
quality measures? 
  Not surprisingly given the small selection coefficient in the person fixed effects model, 
we get relatively little predicted bias from this exercise.  Over all our quality measures, the 
predicted bias is less than 5%, and for only one measure (incontinence) does it exceed 10%.  
Thus, the selection effects based on observables are quantitatively small.  This does not rule out 
selection on unobservables, but it does suggest such selection might be small. 
 
Rate Differential Results 
As noted in Table 2, there is some variation across states in the Medicaid rate-private pay 
price differential. Given potential concerns with the endogeneity of payer status and quality, we 
used the payment differential as an exogenous source of variation across states. Thus, we tested 
whether quality differences between private-pay and Medicaid residents were greatest in those 
states with the largest differential between the private-pay price and Medicaid rate. The key 
coefficient of interest is the interaction of a state’s Medicaid-to-private rate ratio with an 
individual’s Medicaid status.  If lower Medicaid reimbursement is leading to worse treatment of 
Medicaid patients, then as the rate differential increases towards one (i.e., equal payment for 
private-pay and Medicaid), we would expect less difference in quality across Medicaid and 
private-pay patients (thus, negative coefficient estimates). 
Table 5 presents the coefficients of interest from this specification for our patient fixed 
effects model.   There is very little support for the idea that quality is worse in those states with a 
greater payment differential. In fact, most of the estimated coefficients indicate the opposite 
effect.  Only four of the fee interaction coefficients are negative, and only those for restraints,   27 
incontinence and depression are significant.  Strikingly, these are the same outcomes for which 
the main effects on Medicaid status are positive: that is, for these outcomes, quality worsens 
when individuals transition to Medicaid, and less so when the Medicaid payment differential is 
smaller.  So it is possible that there is some effect of higher Medicaid rates in improving 
outcomes in these areas.  Overall, however, the pattern does not indicate that increased Medicaid 
rates lead to better outcomes, consistent with our earlier findings.  Given the range of different 
outcomes examined in this table, this evidence is fairly weak in support of quality as a private 
good. 
 
Local Treatment Effects 
  The other major concern discussed earlier was that, although including person fixed 
effects deals with selection problems in these regressions, it captures only a particular source of 
the variation in treatment, that due only to treatment changes as individuals transition to 
Medicaid.  It is possible that there could be no change in treatment when individuals make such a 
transition, while still being discriminatory in the treatment of patients who arrive as Medicaid.  
That is, the local treatment effect we estimate from this group of switchers may not represent the 
true effects of Medicaid status on treatment. 
  To address this concern, we replace our measure of payer status with a measure based on 
initial payer status on admission (see Table 6).  That is, we are not comparing those who changed 
status in these models, but rather comparing individuals based on what they were labeled when 
they entered the home.  Obviously, in this case, we cannot include person-specific fixed effects, 
so Table 6 shows only models with no fixed effects and home-specific fixed effects.   28 
  In fact, the results are strikingly similar to our earlier findings: by and large positive 
association between Medicaid and quality (negative coefficients), with some negative effects 
(positive coefficients) for incontinence, anti-psychotics, and depression.  Once again, all of the 
coefficients are very small, suggesting no effect in aggregate even the model is identified based 
on those who switch payer status. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Using a variety of identification strategies, the results in this paper confirm the common 
presumption that nursing home quality is a public good.  Specifically, we employed models 
identified by within-facility and within-person variation in payer status and quality; we showed 
that selection on observable dimensions is small; we exploited cross-state variation in the 
Medicaid and private-pay rate differential as an additional source of variation; and we considered 
individuals solely based on payer status at admission.  In every case, there was no consistent 
finding of differential quality for Medicaid patients, and the coefficients of either sign were 
universally quite small.  Overall, our results are consistent with the assumption of uniform 
quality across Medicaid and private-paying residents within facilities. 
This result has both research and policy implications. From a research perspective, this 
study provides support for the long-standing practice of using facility-level data to evaluate 
Medicaid policy effects in the nursing home literature (e.g., Gertler, 1989). Although the MDS 
and other individual-level data are now becoming available to researchers, aggregate facility-
level measures can still serve as a potential complement to the individual-level measures. 
Although there is evidence that quality is often a private good in the physician and hospital   29 
sectors, researchers have also found support for the public good assumption across Medicaid and 
non-Medicaid patients in hospitals (Dranove and White, 1998).  
From a policy perspective, these results point towards the potential for free-ridership on 
the part of state Medicaid programs. If quality is a public good enjoyed equally by all payer 
types, then state Medicaid programs can potentially free ride on higher paying private residents. 
However, although state Medicaid administrators have historically used certificate-of-need laws 
to help keep private-paying residents in joint care settings, two recent trends potentially 
undermine the value of private-paying patients to state Medicaid nursing home programs. First, 
assisted living and other nursing home substitutes have siphoned off some private-paying 
residents. In many instances, individuals exhaust their private resources in the assisted living 
sector before transitioning to Medicaid-financed nursing home care. Second, the nursing home 
industry has become more segregated across facilities over the last several years (Mor et al., 
2004). That is, there are more facilities caring for predominantly Medicaid (or private-pay) 
residents, implying less potential for cross-subsidization across payer types. Thus, although 
quality may be uniform within facilities, market-based trends point towards fewer private-paying 
residents going to homes with Medicaid patients.    30 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  All assessments    Observed from admission 
  Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Physical Restraints   0.09  0.28    0.07  0.26 
Catheters  0.08  0.26    0.09  0.29 
Bedfast  0.06  0.23    0.05  0.22 
Feeding Tubes  0.07  0.25    0.06  0.24 
Anti-psychotics  0.19  0.39    0.21  0.41 
Pressure Ulcers  0.08  0.27    0.09  0.28 
Pain  0.13  0.34    0.14  0.35 
Incontinence  0.54  0.50    0.46  0.50 
Urinary infection  0.09  0.29    0.11  0.31 
Wound infection  0.02  0.13    0.02  0.15 
Fall  0.16  0.37    0.20  0.40 
Depression  0.43  0.50    0.42  0.49 
           
Medicaid  0.65  0.48    0.55  0.50 
Private-payer  0.32  0.47    0.40  0.49 
Other payer  0.04  0.19    0.04  0.20 
           
Female  0.71  0.46    0.68  0.47 
Age  80.48  12.86    79.37  13.11 
Length of stay  850.23  1,146.30    289.96  307.57 
African American  0.09  0.29    0.09  0.29 
Caucasian  0.90  0.30    0.90  0.30 
Other Race  0.01  0.11    0.01  0.12 
No High School  0.18  0.38    0.16  0.37 
High School  0.17  0.37    0.18  0.38 
Some College  0.06  0.24    0.07  0.25 
College  0.03  0.18    0.04  0.19 
Education Missing  0.56  0.50    0.56  0.50 
Married  0.19  0.39    0.23  0.42 
Never Married  0.13  0.34    0.12  0.32 
Widowed  0.57  0.49    0.55  0.50 
Divorced/Separated  0.11  0.31    0.11  0.31 
ADL Score  14.04  6.73    13.15  6.41 
CPS Score  2.92  1.79    2.61  1.73 
Beds  130.02  76.94    130.43  81.92 
For-profit  0.69  0.46    0.69  0.46 
Nonprofit  0.28  0.45    0.28  0.45 
Government  0.03  0.16    0.02  0.15 
Chain Facility  0.62  0.49    0.63  0.48 
Kansas  0.08  0.27    0.07  0.25 
Maine  0.07  0.25    0.07  0.25 
Mississippi  0.05  0.21    0.04  0.21 
North Dakota  0.06  0.23    0.05  0.22 
Ohio  0.59  0.49    0.58  0.49 
South Dakota  0.03  0.16    0.02  0.15 
Washington  0.14  0.35    0.17  0.37 
           
N  1,626,628    872,667 
Notes: There are missing data for certain variables. ADL=activities of daily living; CPS=cognitive performance 
scale.  31 













private pay rate 
Adjusted 
Ratio 
Kansas  1998  357  78.94  84.82  0.93  0.93 
  1999  356  85.55  92.48  0.93  0.93 
  2000  349  92.78  99.48  0.93  0.93 
  2001  344  98.02  106.71  0.92  0.92 
  2002  325  101.10  109.00  0.93  0.93 
             
Maine  1998  133  107.88  142.55  0.76  0.75 
  1999  131  112.53  148.22  0.76  0.75 
  2000  124  117.68  155.59  0.76  0.75 
  2001  117  127.63  162.86  0.78  0.76 
  2002  118  131.73  169.30  0.78  0.76 
             
Mississippi  1998  183  85.82  86.89  0.99  0.99 
  1999  184  90.32  93.69  0.96  0.96 
  2000  182  99.26  100.98  0.98  0.98 
  2001  193  108.32  100.75  1.08  1.08 
  2002  185  112.91  108.30  1.04  1.04 
             
North Dakota  1998-1999  81  104.28  102.22  1.02  1.01 
  1999-2000  79  109.49  106.84  1.02  1.01 
  2000-2001  79  127.03  123.67  1.03  1.02 
  2001-2002  79  134.34  130.81  1.03  1.02 
  2002-2003  78  132.39  128.69  1.03  1.01 
             
Ohio  1998  719  114.95  135.25  0.85  0.85 
  1999  671  117.71  140.48  0.84  0.84 
  2000  731  123.34  143.05  0.86  0.86 
  2001  836  134.43  150.54  0.89  0.89 
  2002  811  149.36  156.06  0.96  0.96 
             
South Dakota  1998-1999  106  79.42  99.61  0.80  0.80 
  1999-2000  106  81.46  103.85  0.78  0.78 
  2000-2001  106  85.53  106.67  0.80  0.80 
  2001-2002  108  96.63  123.07  0.79  0.79 
  2002-2003  110  100.60  129.46  0.78  0.78 
             
Washington  1998  264  118.16  145.74  0.81  0.81 
  1999  262  125.40  147.96  0.85  0.85 
  2000  256  137.43  160.67  0.86  0.86 
  2001  260  142.86  171.84  0.83  0.83 
  2002  258  149.01  178.79  0.83  0.83 
Notes: The rates are weighted by the total number of payer type days within each facility. For Kansas, 
Maine and South Dakota, total private days were not available so all non-Medicaid days were used to 
weight the private-pay rates. North Dakota and South Dakota report their rates from July to June. The 
“adjusted ratio” column accounts for resident acuity across private-pay and Medicaid resident. 
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All models include the covariates listed in Table 1 along with time fixed effects. Absolute values 
of the t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
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All models include the covariates listed in Table 1 along with time fixed effects. Absolute values 
of the t-statistics are presented in parentheses.   34 




















































































































All models include the covariates listed in Table 1 along with person and time fixed effects. 
Absolute values of the t-statistics are presented in parentheses 
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The coefficient estimates reported are the interaction of the case-mix adjusted rate differential 
(Medicaid divided by private-pay) and Medicaid status. All models include the covariates listed 
in Table 1 along time fixed effects. Absolute values of the t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses 
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